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ABSTRACT
Fraud is defined as the utilization of deception for illegal gain by hiding the true
nature of the activity. While organizations lose around $3.7 trillion in revenue due to
financial crimes and fraud worldwide, they can affect all levels of society significantly.
In this dissertation, I focus on credit card fraud in online transactions. Every online
transaction comes with a fraud risk and it is the merchant’s liability to detect and
stop fraudulent transactions. Merchants utilize various mechanisms to prevent and
manage fraud such as automated fraud detection systems and manual transaction
reviews by expert fraud analysts. Many proposed solutions mostly focus on fraud
detection accuracy and ignore financial considerations. Also, the highly effective
manual review process is overlooked. First, I propose Profit Optimizing Neural Risk
Manager (PONRM), a selective classifier that (a) constitutes optimal collaboration
between machine learning models and human expertise under industrial constraints,
(b) is cost and profit sensitive. I suggest directions on how to characterize fraudulent
behavior and assess the risk of a transaction. I show that my framework outperforms
cost-sensitive and cost-insensitive baselines on three real-world merchant datasets.
While PONRM is able to work with many supervised learners and obtain convincing
results, utilizing probability outputs directly from the trained model itself can pose
problems, especially in deep learning as softmax output is not a true uncertainty
measure. This phenomenon, and the wide and rapid adoption of deep learning by
practitioners brought unintended consequences in many situations such as in the in-
famous case of Google Photos’ racist image recognition algorithm; thus, necessitated
the utilization of the quantified uncertainty for each prediction. There have been
recent efforts towards quantifying uncertainty in conventional deep learning methods
(e.g., dropout as Bayesian approximation); however, their optimal use in decision
making is often overlooked and understudied. Thus, I present a mixed-integer pro-
i
gramming framework for selective classification called MIPSC, that investigates and
combines model uncertainty and predictive mean to identify optimal classification and
rejection regions. I also extend this framework to cost-sensitive settings (MIPCSC)
and focus on the critical real-world problem, online fraud management and show that
my approach outperforms industry standard methods significantly for online fraud
management in real-world settings.
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Chapter 1
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
Following the huge success of the recent advances in machine learning and deep
learning, developing strategies to make use of these models optimally becomes imper-
ative. The ability to abstain from making an automated decision when the model is
uncertain about an individual inference is essential to design these strategies. Con-
cisely, this dissertation presents novel methods operating in the intersection of several
areas such as selective classification, uncertainty representation, cost-sensitive learn-
ing, and operations research to make optimal decisions under uncertainty in real-
world applications. Rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, I
introduce the related work around uncertainty representation, selective classification,
mixed-integer programming, and cost-sensitive learning. Following this background,
I propose a cost-sensitive fraud management framework compatible with any super-
vised learning algorithm in Chapter 2. Then, Chapter 3 focuses on a generalizable
selective classification framework, its cost-sensitive extension, and its applications
to fraud management. Finally, in Chapter 4, I conclude the dissertation with key
findings and future research direction.
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1.2 Related Work
1.2.1 Cost-Sensitive Learning
Cost-sensitive learning is a largely studied data mining field in which models
consider different types of costs including asymmetric misclassification costs when
performing learning and prediction tasks. Cost-sensitive learning can treat the loss of
a false positive differently than a false negative whereas regular (cost-sensitive) meth-
ods cannot make a distinction directly. Costs are usually represented as by positive
values whereas benefits are denoted as negative in the cost matrix [Elkan (2001)].
Besides the misclassification costs, test costs such as feature retrieval and label acqui-
sition costs can be of high importance in the modeling of a problem [Turney (1995)].
Although many categorizations are possible, here, we first categorize two main veins
of cost-sensitive learning as “misclassification cost-sensitive learning” and “test cost-
sensitive learning” for simplicity; then we investigate the literature hierarchy deeper
within this categorization.
Misclassification cost-sensitive learning aims to handle different costs arising from
the application domain or class imbalance. For example, in the problem of medical
diagnosis not identifying a serious illness does not incur the same as falsely detecting
a false sickness. Similarly, in the fraud detection domain, transaction amount brings
a dynamic cost to each decision together with the costs of customer retention and
fraud management. There are two main approaches in the cost-sensitive literature to
handle different misclassification costs:
Direct approaches directly incorporate these costs in the loss function in the frame-
work. A pioneering work in these type of methods is Turney (1995). Misclassification
costs are utilized in the fitness of genetic algorithms by the ICET. Differently, Ling
et al. (2004) incorporate misclassification costs in the cost sensitive decision in de-
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cision tree framework. In another study, Drummond and Holte (2000) examine the
cost-sensitivity in relation to attribute selection criteria of decision tree learning and
argue that impurity models cost sensitivity the best. Work of Fan et al. (1999) is the
first study exploring cost-sensitive learning using boosting. Authors achieve this by
making cost-sensitive updates to the AdaBoost’s weak learners at each iteration. Sun
et al. (2007) develop another cost-sensitive boosting algorithm based on AdaBoost
and demonstrate the effectiveness on imbalanced datasets. Authors claim that their
method is more sensitive to cost aspects compared to Fan et al. (1999). Unlike these
studies, Masnadi-Shirazi and Vasconcelos (2011) propose a cost-sensitive boosting
framework based on boosting’s statistical interpretation. Authors modify several
boosting algorithms such as RealBoost, AdaBoost, and LogitBoost and show superi-
ority in terms of cost-minimization. The same authors later introduce a cost-sensitive
SVM framework in Masnadi-Shirazi et al. (2012).
Another approach is converting cost-insensitive learners into cost-sensitive ones by
performing pre-processing or post-processing. We refer to these methods as meta cost-
sensitive learners as in Ling and Sheng (2008). The well-known study by Domingos
(1999) introduces the method, MetaCost. As the name suggests, this method is
meta-cost sensitive learner that can be applied to any type of classifier. It uses a
bagging variant and works as follows. MetaCost bootstraps training examples and
learners multiple models. Then, using average voting it generates probabilities and
weights them with the cost matrix, finally relabels the instances with the expected
class labels to minimize cost. Sheng and Ling (2006) propose a similar meta-learning
method which does not require accurate probability estimates instead uses accurate
rankings. It relies on cross-validation to search for the best threshold of probability
to find the optimal cut-off point. As these can be seen as post-processing based
meta cost-sensitive learners, there also are pre-processors. Zadrozny et al. (2003)
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use sampling to modify class distributions with respect to costs associated with the
labels.
Cost-sensitive classification literature focuses on the problem of ”test costs” more
specifically than the cost-sensitive learning literature. These costs are explained as
the cost incurred for acquiring extra information in terms of features. Medical diagno-
sis problem is again a good analogy for explaining the concept of test costs. A doctor
may require additional tests to make a more confident diagnosis; however, it comes
with time and monetary costs. So, it is the doctor’s decision to make this investment
or not based on the expected benefit of acquiring the result of the tests. Similarly,
in the cost-sensitive classification domain, a framework could choose to ”invest” in
acquiring more information (features) if the expected benefit justifies the cost. In
Turney (1995), the essential problem of minimizing the cost of classification when
the tests are expensive is investigated. It argues that decision trees are the intuitive
structure for this problem and introduced a hybrid genetic decision tree induction
algorithm called ICET to generate low cost decision trees. Misclassification and test
costs are incorporated in the fitness function. Zubek and Dietterich (2002) model
cost-sensitive classification problem considering both misclassification and test costs
as Markov Decision Process (MDP). Each observed feature brings the model to a
new state and incurs a cost and changes the expected benefit of the model. Authors
develop and combine statistical pruning and systematic search techniques to find a
heuristic to the optimal solution in feasible time. Ling et al. (2004) also explore this
problem using a decision trees by combining test and misclassifications costs using
static cost structure. Authors interpret and scale misclassification costs in terms of
monetary value as in the test costs. In Chai et al. (2004), authors develop a test-cost
sensitive naive bayes learner unlike previous decision tree based approaches. In a
similar vein, Zhang et al. (2005) do not focus on developing new techniques but in-
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vestigates the effect of missing data in test-cost sensitive classification and concludes
that missing data notion can be useful for decisioning. These can be perceived similar
to obtaining a label in active inference literature but the costly information is not
the label but the feature itself. Attenberg and Provost (2011) develop techniques
for active cost-sensitive classification problem and investigates the effect of and the
optimal choice for obtaining a ground-truth label at prediction time. Authors aim
to estimate how many times they are likely to see the same instance in a streaming
setting and how they can incorporate this estimation when making a label acquisition
decision considering its cost and expected benefit. This is rather different from our
work as we do not see an instance multiple times and our decision of label acquisition
is based on uncertainty and monetary expectations.
Here, we move on to the extensions of the cost-sensitive learning frameworks.
Reinforcement learning is utilized to make sequential cost-sensitive decisions to max-
imize long term profits in campaigns by Pednault et al. (2002). Margineantu (2005)
extends the cost-sensitive principles introduced by Elkan (2001) to active learning set-
tings using bagged probability estimation trees described in Provost and Domingos
(2003). Attenberg and Provost (2011) propose the first online active cost-sensitive
inference framework where the cost and benefit of encountering a labeled instance
multiple times is considered when making a label acquisition decision. In a similar
vein, Yang et al. (2009) use random forest based conformal prediction framework for
medical diagnosis. This is the first paper extending cost-sensitive learning to confor-
mal prediction settings which promise reliable confidence levels for each prediction.
Kim (2010) proposes cost-sensitive condition random fields for structured learning.
Authors demonstrate the framework’s effectiveness using three applications such as
human walking motion identification, oceanography biome characteristics prediction,
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and object recognition in hierarchy. Semi-supervised cost-sensitive learning is inves-
tigated in Wang et al. (2012). They claim that cost-sensitive learning frameworks
are effective in the existence of adequate labeled data but this is the first exten-
sion where a lot of unlabeled and a few labeled data are are available. Recently,
cost-sensitive classification is modeled using robust minimax approach to allow di-
rect minimization of the cost of mistakes as a convex optimization problem in Asif
et al. (2015). In contrast, previous methods minimize a convex heuristic of the loss
function. Experiments show their method’s effectiveness to be better or comparable
to the existing cost-sensitive boosting and SVM methods. One interesting study in
face recognition, Li et al. (2016) show that even an seemingly unrelated domain can
benefit from cost-sensitive learning. They minimize the misclassification cost instead
of the misclassification error to incur and model varying costs of not recognizing a
face accurately.
1.2.2 Fraud Detection using Machine Learning
Fraud detection has been an active area for data mining researchers since Ghosh
and Reilly (1994); however, it has not been extensively studied due to private and
confidential nature of financial data. Despite these limitations, researchers managed
to conduct studies with industry partners on proprietary datasets. While Fawcett and
Provost (1997) and Chan et al. (1999) propose techniques for specific fraud detection
applications, Fawcett and Provost (1999) formalize the class of activity monitoring
problems which includes fraud detection. They may not be directly applicable or
state-of-the-art today; however, they remain very relevant in terms of ideas they
introduce and foundation they provide for future development.
In the more recent years, major studies focused on credit card fraud detection such
6
as Bolton and Hand (2002), Maes et al. (2002), and Van Vlasselaer et al. (2015). Due
to the popularity of social media and user-generated content, fraudulent or misleading
content detection became important. Recently, graph mining approaches have gained
more traction and the product review fraud detection by Hooi et al. (2016) have
received widespread attention. Theoretical contributions on graph mining focusing
on fraud detection applications such as studied in the work from Zhang et al. (2017)
and Zhou et al. (2017) are also made. For more comprehensive survey papers on
fraud detection methods please refer to the studies, Phua et al. (2010) and Ngai et al.
(2011).
Although fraud loss is an enormous problem for e-commerce merchants, there
is only a pair of studies by Halvaiee and Akbari (2014) and Carneiro et al. (2017)
investigating this problem from a merchant’s perspective. However, these works aim
to improve the accuracy of fraud detection alone, instead of a profit and loss aware
fraud management strategy.
Fraud prevention teams must take various complications that arise from allowing
or rejecting a transaction into account. Declining a legitimate transaction would
often result in a loss of that customer’s business whereas approving a fraudulent
transaction would force the merchant to cover the fraud costs. Simply training a
machine learning classifier by overlooking various costs leads to a less than optimal
fraud management strategy. Researchers have been developing cost-sensitive learning
frameworks and the literature in covered in detail in 1.2.1. However, none of cost-
sensitive learning frameworks in fraud detection domain approaches the problem from
a selective classification perspective. Being the closest study, Carneiro et al. (2017)
recognize the role of manual reviews in fraud prevention process; however, they do not
provide a systematic analysis on how to integrate machine learning based detection
with manual reviews under cost and capacity constraints. In Chapter 3, we develop
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a cost-sensitive fraud management framework incorporating all relevant capacities,
costs and evaluate its financial impact with multiple real-world merchant datasets.
1.2.3 Uncertainty Representation and Applications
Many practitioners and researchers make use of the probability outputs from the
trained model (i.e., softmax output in deep learning) as an uncertainty measure; how-
ever, many classifiers output distorted probabilities according to Niculescu-Mizil and
Caruana (2005) and this may lead to misleading actions. Moreover, even when cor-
rected by proposed probability calibration methods such as Isotonic Regression by
Kruskal (1964) or Platt Scaling by Platt et al. (1999), posterior probabilities as point
estimates lack the detail and information to provide a correct interpretation of the
model uncertainty. So, Bayesian approaches such as Polson et al. (2017); Rasmussen
(2006) are the intuitive methods to quantify and represent the model uncertainty cor-
rectly. Due to the computational complexity of the Bayesian methods, Gal proposes
using Monte Carlo sampling over dropout neural networks as an approximation to
Bayesian inference in Gal and Ghahramani (2016). This approach’s effectiveness is
demonstrated in a medical-domain application in Leibig et al. (2017). Our work in
Chapter 4 builds upon this framework by combining model uncertainty and predictive
mean optimally for classification with reject option or selective classification.
1.2.4 Selective Classification
Selective classification or classification with reject option has been studied since
the 1970’s and it has started gaining traction again in the recent decade. It is defined
as giving an option to the classifier to express uncertainty and to reject making a
certain prediction. Chow (1970), being the first study in the field, introduces the
concept and proposes a decision theoretic framework to find the Bayesian-optimal
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reject threshold. Tortorella (2000), and Santos-Pereira and Pires (2005) propose
cost-sensitive learning extensions to classification with reject option methods with
arbitrary cost-functions. Herbei and Wegkamp (2006) develop excess risk bounds for
the classification with a reject option for both cost-sensitive and cost-insensitive cases.
On the other hand, El-Yaniv and Wiener (2010) find these cost models unsuitable
as it is difficult to quantify the cost of rejection in many cases. Instead, authors
focus on theoretical risk-coverage (RC) trade-off without considering explicit costs.
Researchers have been adapting this idea to different classifiers and recently Geifman
and El-Yaniv (2017) modified deep neural networks for selective classification. Our
work differs fundamentally from Geifman and El-Yaniv (2017) by (1) not being built-
in within the deep neural network itself; so it becomes compatible with any existing
trained models and systems, and (2) utilizing dropout MC sampling for uncertainty
estimation.
1.2.5 Mixed-Integer Programming
Mixed-Integer programming (MIP) is a powerful modeling tool that has been
around for decades. MIP has been commonly utilized by the operations research
community; however, practitioners and researchers from other domains hesitated to
adopt it due to its computational and theoretical complexity Bixby (2010). During
the last three decades, algorithmic advances in integer optimization combined with
hardware improvements have enabled a 200 billion factor speedup in solving MIP
problems according to Bertsimas et al. (2016). Now, mixed integer linear techniques
are viewed as mature, fast, and robust; thus are applied to the problems with up to
millions of variables Geißler et al. (2012). Machine learning community also started
employing MIP techniques in several problems, such as for optimal feature selection as
in Bertsimas et al. (2016) and for deriving interpretable machine learning algorithms
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as shown by Goh and Rudin (2014). The key factors for our decision to use an MIP
formulation are (1) its ability to naturally express the problem, the objective, and the
constraints, (2) its capability to provide an exact optimal solution, and (3) its ease
of extensibility to more specific settings.
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Chapter 2
COST-SENSITIVE DECISION MAKING FOR ONLINE FRAUD
MANAGEMENT
2.1 Introduction
According to Pickett and Pickett (2002), financial crime is the utilization of de-
ception for illegal gain by hiding the true nature of the activity. They use the terms
financial crime and fraud interchangeably since financial crime very often involves
fraud. Financial crime can be committed through many fraud schemes such as check
and credit card fraud, mortgage fraud, medical fraud, corporate fraud, bank account
fraud, and health care fraud. These types of crimes involve relevant illegal activi-
ties such as identity theft, cyber attacks, money laundering, and social engineering
according to Gottschalk (2010). While organizations lose around $3.7 trillion in rev-
enue due to financial crimes and fraud worldwide (ACFE (2016)), they can affect all
levels of society significantly (Interpol (2009)). Thus, fraud is a huge problem and its
detection, prevention, and management is critical.
In 2016, card fraud alone cost businesses over $20 billion and continues to grow dra-
matically (Nilson (2016)). Around 60% of this loss was caused by online transactions,
as e-commerce fraud rates doubled since last year. E-commerce fraud magnitude is
estimated to reach $71 billion during the next five years due to the steady rise in cost
per fraudulent transaction while fraud rates continue to increase (Juniper (2017)).
During fraud management, merchants are generally liable for paying for the fraud
costs in the e-commerce ecosystem. They suffer the losses arising from shipped mer-
chandise, shipping and handling costs alongside chargeback fees issued by the card
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processor (Montague (2010)). KS&R (2016) reports that for every dollar of loss, mer-
chants end up losing $2.40 on average as fraud management costs. When aggregated
they lose around 1.5 percent of their total revenue to fraud today - three times in-
crease during the last 3 years. So, they implement various strategies to fight fraud
from automated fraud prevention systems to manual order reviews by expert fraud
analysts (CyberSource (2016)).
One may think that manual reviews will be going away with advances in artifi-
cial intelligence; however, they remain very much relevant to the industry thanks to
their accuracy. According to CyberSource (2017), manual review is an established
mechanism for fraud prevention with adoption by 79% of North American businesses.
Despite all efforts to fight fraud, significant improvements can still be made by
investigating and answering following questions: What are the most important char-
acteristics of a fraudulent transaction that a merchant can capture without causing
friction? As state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms are not perfect how should
a merchant use them? What is the cost optimal role of expert manual reviews and
revisions in this process?
Improving fraud prevention is not as straightforward as increasing fraud detection
accuracy due to several factors: firstly, rejecting a legitimate order and approving
a fraudulent transaction do not incur the same cost, secondly, transaction amount
varies greatly by order, thus affecting profitability of a sale. Hence, merchants need
to implement cost and profit sensitive fraud prevention strategies.
In this chapter, we introduce Profit Optimizing Neural Risk Manager (PONRM),
a cost-sensitive decision maker for e-commerce fraud management. Our framework
infers the risk of a transaction being fraud and combines it with the transaction
amount to make an optimal decision regarding its fraud management strategy (i.e.
automated accept, reject or manual review). The main contributions of our work are:
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• A cost-sensitive decision making framework to manage fraud while maximizing
profits and minimizing costs;
• A transaction risk model incorporating fraud characteristics and financial con-
straints relevant to a merchant;
• An optimal collaboration strategy between human experts and machine learn-
ing models for fraud management
2.2 Problem Definition
Every online transaction comes with a risk of being fraudulent. As merchants are
responsible for detecting fraud, they must take this risk into account or they would
suffer from losses due to fraud. So, when a merchant receives an order it can accept,
reject or manually review that transaction based on their risk assessment of that
transaction. Brief explanation of each decision is as follows:
• Accept: Accepting a transaction means that merchant approves the trans-
action and processes the payment. Accepting a legitimate transaction yields
some profit. If the transaction turns out to be fraudulent, merchant becomes
responsible for the dispute handling and losses.
• Reject: Rejecting a transaction means that merchant declines the transaction
and payment does not go through. In this case, sale does not happen, so they
will not be earning a profit even if the order was legitimate. However, rejecting
a legitimate transaction may cause the loss of lifetime value of the customer.
• Review: In the case of sending the transaction to manual review, merchant
halts the order and sends the transaction details to an expert fraud analyst for
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investigation. Fraud analyst would confirm the legitimacy of the order by man-
ually analyzing the transaction details and by following-up with the consumer
directly before approving or rejecting it. For the sake of our modeling, we as-
sume that manual review always leads to correct decisions. However, expert
fraud analysts are scarce and expensive resources and should be utilized wisely.
We refer to these decisions made for a set of transactions as the fraud management
strategy. We define the task of finding an optimal fraud management strategy as fol-
lows: Given a streaming set of transactions, determine the accept, reject, and review
populations to maximize profits by accepting most of the legitimate transactions; and
achieve this objective by minimizing customer insults, fraud losses, and costly manual
reviews.
2.3 Methodology
Figure 2.1 presents an overview of our system. It consists of two learning and a
pair of data manipulation components. The workflow starts with a data preprocessing
and feature extraction task. 2nd component of the system carries out the task of
inferring the probability of each transaction being fraudulent. 3rd component of the
system generates cost-sensitive labels. 4th and final component of the system learns
a function to maximize the profit based on a criteria incorporating the transaction
amount and its fraud risk probability. We call this component as Profit Optimizing
Neural Risk Manager (PONRM). Each following subsection explains one component
of our system in detail and their order is aligned with the numbering in Figure 2.1.
2.3.1 Feature Extraction
Identifying consumer behavior to detect fraud is a delicate task. Businesses are
hesitant to implement multi-factor authentication systems since it can be a source
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Figure 2.1: System Overview
of friction and collecting invasive information such as cookie mining and device fin-
gerprinting may damage the merchant’s reputation. However, it may be possible to
develop fraud prevention models without above options since merchants already have
access to a rich source of information about their customers: the order form. Cus-
tomers provide their personal and contact information to ensure the delivery of their
order, so these can be leveraged by the fraud teams to build models. We present 4
types of patterns that merchants can reproduce:
Location Based Patterns: We measure the distance between IP geolocation
and physical addresses. We create risk profiles for zip codes based on historical fraud
behaviors observed from corresponding districts.
Phone Intelligence Patterns: Usage of VOIP, prepaid, spoofed, or invalid
phone number is detected and may indicate malicious intent. Area code of a phone
number is used to verify the (in-)consistency with the physical address.
IP Intelligence Patterns: An IP address coming through a proxy or an anony-
mous network could indicate risky behavior. We also profile the risk based on histor-
ical fraudulent behavior observed from blocks of IPs.
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Email Address Patterns: We create email domain related attributes such as
existence, disposability, anonymity, tenure, and category. Informed by Zafarani and
Liu (2015), we derive features directly from the email handle (i.e. different email
address characteristics such as character diversity, typing efficiency, proportion of
numbers, etc.) to determine if an email address was created with malicious intent.
By normalizing, profiling and combining these patterns, we come up with a set of
102 features that is used in our fraud classification model.
2.3.2 Fraud Classification Model & Risk Score Calculation
Risk score constitute the input of the proposed model, PONRM. It is composed
of a pair of elements: first element is the transaction amount ($) and second element
is a probability score of a transaction being fraud given its features. We propose
using any supervised learner (θ) providing a robust posterior probability for fraud
probability estimation such as:
fi = P (Yi2 = 1|Xi; θ) (2.1)
where f = {fi; fi ∈ [0, 1] ∧ i = 1 . . . N}. As given in Equation 2.1, f is assigned
with the probability of a transaction being fraudulent. Finally, the risk score matrix
R is built by concatenating f and the transaction amount ($) as;
R =
[
f , $
]
(2.2)
2.3.3 Cost-Sensitive Label Derivation
The 3rd component is concerned with the training labels that PONRM will use.
Cost-sensitive models require a pair of entities to be trained with: ground-truth deci-
sions and cost-sensitive incentives for those decisions Elkan (2001). Possible decisions
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are to accept, review, and reject a transaction. Incentives are determined based on
earnings and losses that may arise from accepting, reviewing, or rejecting.
From Binary Labels to Trinary Ground-Truth Decisions:
In the ideal binary decision making process, the model would accept all legitimate and
reject all fraudulent transactions. However, models often fall short in performance
compared to time consuming expert manual reviews in reality. To optimally inte-
grate highly accurate but costly manual reviews into a decision making framework, a
translation from binary to trinary decisions is necessary. Weight of the review deci-
sions should be manipulatable based on the review capacity of a merchant. Following
these constraints, we translate binary (legitimate,fraudulent) labels to trinary (ac-
cept,review,reject) decisions as [Zi1,Zi2,Zi3]. After the translation, legitimate trans-
actions become Zi = [1, r, 0] while fraudulent transactions become Zi = [0, r, 1] as
ground-truth decisions. r is a parameter for tuning the number of review decisions
compared to accept or reject decisions, proportionally.
Computing Cost-Sensitive Decision Incentives:
By following the fraud management strategy considerations from Section 2.2, we
incentivize our decisions with 4 parameters, namely: profit rate (pr), lifetime value
multiplier (ltv), fraud loss multiplier (flm), and review cost (rc). Profit rate is
defined as the percentage of the transaction amount the merchant is earning as profit.
lifetime value multiplier simply models the lost opportunity due to losing customer’s
future business when a legitimate transaction is rejected (customer insult). Fraud
loss multiplier weights the losses due to fraudulent activity to represent associated
legal and chargeback costs. Finally, review cost is the compensation expert manual
reviewers are paid per transaction. Derivation of the incentives for each decision is
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Table 2.1: Incentives for Accepting, Reviewing or Rejecting a Transaction
Decision Incentives
Accept Review Reject
Legitimate pr ∗ $i pr ∗ $i − rc −pr ∗ $i ∗ ltv
Legitimate - Offset (1 + ltv) ∗ pr ∗ $i (1 + ltv) ∗ pr ∗ $i − rc 0
Fraudulent −flm ∗ $i −rc 0
Fraudulent - Offset 0 flm ∗ $i − rc flm ∗ $i
presented in Table 2.1. Although rejecting a fraudulent transaction does not provide
any benefit, it is still the most desirable decision for a fraudulent transaction. From an
information theoretic perspective, there is a need for a positive scalar to incentivize
the learning process. To stay truthful to the initial incentives but represent most
desirable decisions we offset the incentives: we add the initial incentive of accepting a
fraudulent transaction to every decision incentive for fraudulent transactions. We add
the initial incentive of rejecting a legitimate transaction to every decision incentive
for legitimate transactions.
2.3.4 Profit Optimizing Neural Risk Manager
Many of the off-the-shelf classification models are cost-insensitive; thus are sub-
optimal for our task. Cost of accepting a fraudulent transaction and cost of rejecting
a legitimate transaction can vary largely in different settings. While these costs differ
between legitimate and fraudulent cases, they are also dependent on the transaction
amounts. Moreover, off-the-shelf classification tools are not very adaptable for the
expert opinion to intervene when necessary.
Hence, we formally define Profit Optimizing Neural Risk Manager (PONRM)
which produces decisions as accept, review, or reject for transactions according to each
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transaction’s risk score. PONRM mostly mimics a multilayer perceptron structure
with sigmoid activation functions;
Ri = [fi, $i] (2.3)
H(0) = σ(W(0)R + b(0)) (2.4)
H(i) = σ(W(i)H(i−1) + b(i)) for i = 1, ..., l (2.5)
Zˆ = softmax(W(l+1)H(l) + b(l+1)) (2.6)
where R ∈ RN×2+ is the risk score matrix. Each H(i) ∈ RN×
i√L is a higher dimensional( i
√
L)
internal representation of the risk score in the multilayer perceptron. It outputs the
decisions for each transaction in the output layer Zˆ ∈ [0, 1]N×3. To learn the parame-
ters of the model, we use log loss multiplied by cost sensitive incentives and minimize
the loss function by tuning W(i),b(i):
Loss = − 1
N
[
N∑
i=1
3∑
c=1
log−loss︷ ︸︸ ︷[
Zic log Zˆic
] incentive︷︸︸︷
Bic
]
+
regularization︷ ︸︸ ︷
l∑
i=1
αi||W(i)||22 (2.7)
where N is the number of transactions. Zic quantifies the weight of assignment of
the ground-truth decision c to the transaction i. Zˆic is the predicted assignments by
the PONRM model for transaction i and decision c. B ∈ RN×3 and Bic quantifies the
incentive of assigning the ith transaction to decision c. We use L-BFGS quasi-newton
optimization implementation of ScipyOptimizer interface of Tensorflow to minimize
the proposed loss function Abadi et al. (2015).
2.4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our framework in various settings.
In the first experiment, we present the effectiveness of PONRM in comparison to other
cost-sensitive and cost-insensitive approaches. Next, we evaluate the performance of
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our system alongside baseline risk managers under different manual review capacities.
Finally, we explore how fraud classification models perform with and without risk
managers.
2.4.1 Evaluation Metrics
We introduce a new metric, named profit gain (PG), to measure the performance
of our framework and the baseline models in a financially sound way. We normalize
this metric using two extreme fraud management strategies:
No Fraud Management: A merchant can choose not to interfere with any
orders and accept all transactions as if they were legitimate. Then, it would suffer
the maximum loss from fraudulent orders but not from any customer insults. We
refer the total profit this company makes as $nofraudmanagement.
Oracle: If a merchant could model the fraud characteristics perfectly, it would
be accepting all legitimate orders and rejecting the fraudulent ones. In this case, its
fraud and customer insult loss would be zero. It would earn the profit from all the
legitimate transactions. We refer its total profit as $oracle.
To robustly measure the financial performance gain with a standardized scoring
mechanism, we introduce profit gain as:
profit gain =
$m − $nofraudmanagement
$oracle − $nofraudmanagement (2.8)
where $m is the profit of the model under experimentation. While calculating the
profits, not-offset decision incentives in Table 2.1 is used. Also, we use F-measure
to evaluate our fraud detection performance. As we assume perfect decisions by re-
viewers, review decisions are treated as accept for legitimate and reject for fraudulent
transactions in calculation of F-measure. Each experiment is run 16 times and the
average performance is reported for each parameter setting. For each parameter con-
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
OTA PGS DGS
Transactions 22,203 36,783 39,784
Fraudulent Transactions 349 (1.57%) 253 (0.69%) 1,536 (3.86%)
Transaction Amount Mean (µ) $622.25 $177.22 $75.61
µfraudulent/µlegimate 1.06 0.84 0.87
Manual Review Capacity 30% 20% 10%
figuration, best performing setting in terms of PG is reported as the representative
performance of a model.
2.4.2 Dataset & Parameter Settings
We work with online transactions of three e-commerce merchants; an online travel
agency, a physical goods store, and a digital goods store. We sample 1 month of trans-
actional data for each company (October 2017), and remove transactions that do not
include a transaction amount. Since some of the transactions have different curren-
cies than USD, all the transaction amounts are converted to USD equivalent. Next,
features are extracted as described in Section 2.3.1 for all datasets. Categorical fea-
tures are one-hot encoded to ensure compatibility across different classifiers. Missing
values are imputed with mean-values for the numeric, with ’Category-other’ for the
categorical variables. We estimate each merchant’s manual review capacity according
to CyberSource (2017). Table 2.2 presents the datasets’ descriptive statistics.
We use the first 80% of the transactions as the training dataset, and the rest as
the test dataset. To calculate the decision incentives, we set profit rate(pr) to 5%,
lifetime value multiplier (ltv) to 3, fraud loss multiplier (flm) to 2.4, and review cost
to $3 based on estimates from the merchants. For fraud classification models, we ex-
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periment with logistic regression(LR), gradient boosting machine (GBM), multilayer
perceptron (MLP), and random forests (RF).
2.4.3 PONRM vs. Cost-Sensitive and Cost-Insensitive Baselines
In this experiment set, we investigate PONRM’s performance in different setting
in comparison with baseline cost sensitive and cost insensitive approaches.
Experimental Setup:
Among all fraud classification models multilayer perceptron (MLP) resembles a sim-
ilar structure to PONRM, hence, we report its performance characteristics alongside
PONRM.
Baselines:
We introduce following baseline architectures:
• MLP is the multilayer perceptron classifier. We train a cost insensitive MLP
classifier to detect legitimate and fraud detections. Transactions classified as
legitimate are given accept, and fraudulent are given reject decisions.
• CostMLP is a cost sensitive binary classification model. It uses MLP as its
learning component. Incentives of rejecting and accepting are given alongside
with binary transaction labels. As in MLP, transactions classified as legitimate
are given accept, and fraudulent are given reject decisions.
• CostMLPwithR is a cost sensitive trinary classification model. It uses MLP
as its learning component. Incentives are given alongside trinary ground-truth
decisions. Practically, it is same as feeding transaction features to PONRM
directly and bypassing the fraud classification model.
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• MLP+PONRM is our proposed framework. It uses MLP as its fraud classi-
fication model component and PONRM as the risk manager.
We use profit gain (PG) and F-Measure to evaluate performances of above listed
models. A grid search with l = [0, 1, 2, 3] and α = [0, 0.0001] is performed for each
MLP based model. First layer’s layer size (L) is set to 300 in PONRM and other
MLP based models. Each consecutive layer’s size is calculated by square-rooting the
previous layer’s size.
Results:
MLP+PONRM framework shows superior performance in terms of both performance
metrics. Models with review decision options (CostMLPwithR, MLP+PONRM) also
achieves superior results than models without review decision (MLP, CostMLP). Cost
sensitive approaches (CostMLP, CostMLPwithR) performs better than their cost in-
sensitive counterpart (MLP) for maximizing the profit gain and increasing F-Measure.
One exception is the F-Measure performance in PGS dataset where having the small-
est average fraudulent transaction amount leads to lower gains in decision incentives
biased for rejecting fraudulent transactions. Thus, CostMLP performs worse than
MLP.
Our proposed framework MLP+PONRM consistently overperforms CostMLP-
withR. Even in CostMLPwithR’s best performing case, MLP+PONRM achieves 20%
greater profit gain and 24% better F-Measure overall.
2.4.4 PONRM vs. Risk Managers Under Different Review Capacities
In our third experiment set, we aim to show the efficacy of PONRM in compar-
ison with other baseline risk managers in maximizing profit gain. We also explore
the performance under different review capacities to ensure robust execution of our
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Table 2.3: Comparison between PONRM and Cost-Sensitive and Cost-Insensitive
Baselines
OTA PGS DGS
PG F-Meas PG F-Meas PG F-Meas
MLP 0.1207 0.2769 0.0170 0.3115 0.1727 0.4143
CostMLP 0.0325 0.2874 0.0673 0.3048 0.2100 0.4222
CostMLPwithR 0.5954 0.7599 0.5280 0.7110 0.4541 0.5021
MLP+PONRM 0.8113 0.8690 0.6514 0.8523 0.5876 0.6661
framework under various financial settings.
Baselines:
Coupled with RF fraud classification model, we introduce 2 baseline fraud manage-
ment strategies to compare with PONRM as follows:
• Naive Risk Manager (NRM): This model assigns accept/reject decisions
based on a fraud classification model. If fraud classification model classifies the
transaction as legitimate, it accepts, and if as fraudulent, it rejects. Next, it
selects transactions randomly based on the review capacity and converts their
decisions to review.
• Price Prioritized Risk Manager (PPRM): Similar to NRM, this risk
manager uses a fraud classification model to produce initial decisions as accept
or reject. Next, it assigns the transactions having highest transaction amounts
to review considering the capacity under experimentation. To achieve this, it
first finds a transaction amount threshold based on the observed historical data,
then sends the transactions exceeding this threshold until the specified review
capacity is filled.
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Experimental Setup:
To be able to compare the performance of different risk managers, we fix the fraud
classification model in each experiment. We explore different parameters of RF, GBM,
and MLP and report the best results.
We run experiments with review ratios of 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% and report
their profit gain accordingly. Since there is no standard setting to enforce PONRM
to produce any of the review ratios of 10%, 20%, 30% or 40%, we experiment with
different values of the parameter review class weight (r) between 0.4 and 1.1 with
0.05 increments. According to the review ratio each PONRM experiment produces,
we chunk them into bins of 10%, 20%, 30% or 40% review rates. We pick the best
average performance of PONRM in the bins as the representative performance of the
corresponding bin. Setting the review ratios for NRM and PPRM is straightforward.
Results:
Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3, and Figure 2.4 show PONRM’s performance in terms of Profit
Gain when manual review capacity of the user is tweaked between 0.1 and 0.4. At first
sight, it is clear that PONRM almost always performs significantly superior to the
baseline methods regardless of the Fraud Classification Model used in the framework.
Some other key findings are given below:
• Profit gain improves when manual review capacity is increased in OTA Dataset.
For most of its transactions, review cost is negligible compared to the expected
loss or profit, thus, when given maximum capacity provided sending as much
transactions as possible to review makes sense.
• According to Figure 2.2(b), Figure 2.3(b), Figure 2.4(b), Figure 2.2(c), Figure
2.3(c), and Figure 2.4(c), sending most transactions for manual revision may
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(a) OTA (b) PGS (c) DGS
Figure 2.2: Performance of Risk Managers under Different Review Capacities Using
Random Forest as the Fraud Classification Model
not be a sound strategy for PHY and DGS datasets again due to the transaction
amount distribution. So, end-users could identify the optimal manual review
ratio and implement their model accordingly. This would also let them save
time and human resources as they would automating the process more.
• We observe the biggest performance differences when manual review ratio is 0.1
which is the most common capacity for larger merchants. PONRM performs
between up to 3 times better than PPRM and 4 times better than NRM in the
best case, however, PPRM slowly catches up when the manual review ratio is
unrealistically high.
• PPRM’s constantly superior performance compared to NRM asserts that con-
sideration of the transaction amount is crucial for risk management.
• Random Forest performs the best overall among all fraud classification models
when used with PONRM. We recommend using Random Forest as the Fraud
Classification Model if there is no capacity to experiment with several options.
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(a) OTA (b) PGS (c) DGS
Figure 2.3: Performance of Risk Managers under Different Review Capacities using
Multilayer Perceptron as the Fraud Classification Model
(a) OTA (b) PGS (c) DGS
Figure 2.4: Performance of Risk Managers under Different Review Capacities Using
Gradient Boosting as the Fraud Classification Model
2.4.5 Which Classifier to Use as the Fraud Classification Model?
Posterior probability distribution based on the selected classifier may greatly affect
the performance of PONRM. Thus, we experiment with four previously mentioned
supervised learners to demonstrate their effects in the framework. Experimental
setup and parameter settings are explored as in Section 2.4.4 and results with best
parameter combinations are reported here for the sake of brevity.
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2.4.6 Experimental Setup and Baselines
Similar to the previous experiment, Profit Gain is our primary metric in this set
of experiments. Precision, accuracy, and F-measure are also provided to enable ad-
ditional analysis and comparisons. These metrics are constructed using the ”Fraud”
outcome as the target value due to its appropriateness to the fraud detection con-
text. Accuracy, despite being a gold-standard measure, is not reported because of its
uninformativeness with imbalanced datasets and cost-sensitive nature of the problem.
First, we compare the performance of the Fraud Classification Models without in-
tegrating manual review process to observe their characteristics on all datasets. Then,
we compare different PONRM models to base fraud classifiers to reveal the neces-
sity of utilizing manual review process optimally to boost performance. Finally, we
investigate how the specified Fraud Classification Model and selected Cost-Sensitive
Decision Maker interacts.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.4, manual review capacity of vendors differ by rev-
enue. Here, we employ the expected manual review rates accordingly and assess the
effectiveness of our framework with different fraud classification models. So, OTA’s
manual review rate is assumed to be 0.3, while PGS’s being 0.2 and DGS’s 0.1 as
calculated by their reported revenue.
Results
Table 2.4, Table 2.5, and Table 2.6 demonstrate the performance of PONRM and
Fraud Classification Model itself. We report precision, recall and F-measure metric
scores alongside profit gain. Some major findings are given as follows:
• RF based fraud classification model with no risk manager often produce bet-
ter results than the others with no risk manager. Especially its effectiveness in
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terms of profit gain contributes significantly to the RF+PONRM’s performance,
hence RF+PONRM generally gives the best performance. In the detailed ex-
periments, we recognize that increasing the number of trees in the RF improves
the profit gain of RF+PONRM as it reduces the variance of the fraud classi-
fication model and smooths the posterior probability distribution. Hence, we
recommend the utilization of RF with higher number of trees if there is not
enough resources to experiment with various models.
• MLP+PONRM performs well on all datasets. Specifically on OTA, it is marginally
the best model where MLP uses only one hidden layer. There is a negative corre-
lation between MLP+PONRM performance and number of layers in the MLP
fraud classification model since it does not represent uncertainty accurately
when complex.
• GBM + PONRM does not perform well as Gradient Boosting is known to distort
its posterior probabilities in any dataset. As PONRM depends greatly on the
accuracy of posterior probabilities, Gradient Boosting is not an appropriate
choice for our purposes. Probability calibration using a method such as Isotonic
Regression can help remedy this problem and may be considered if a classifier
with distorted probabilities are desired to be used Niculescu-Mizil and Caruana
(2005).
• Logistic regression does not do an adequate job for our purposes as decision
boundaries often present non-linear patterns.
• We observe no correlation between Fraud Classification Model’s performance
based on gold-standard measures and PONRM’s profit gain. So, Fraud Classi-
fication Model selection based on F-measure, precision, or recall is not sensible
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Table 2.4: Classifier Performance - Online Travel Agency (OTA)
Profit Gain Precision Recall F-Measure
Risk Mgr None PONRM None PONRM None PONRM None PONRM
LR 0.118 0.743 0.669 0.9672 0.168 0.756 0.269 0.849
GBM 0.164 0.781 0.365 0.940 0.304 0.795 0.332 0.861
MLP 0.121 0.811 0.656 0.940 0.176 0.808 0.277 0.869
RF 0.097 0.744 0.805 1.000 0.107 0.767 0.188 0.868
Table 2.5: Classifier Performance - Physical Goods Store (PGS)
Profit Gain Precision Recall F-Measure
Risk Mgr None PONRM None PONRM None PONRM None PONRM
LR 0.017 0.650 0.386 1.000 0.100 0.746 0.159 0.855
GBM 0.069 0.633 0.329 0.697 0.319 0.777 0.324 0.735
MLP 0.017 0.651 0.308 0.9439 0.315 0.777 0.312 0.852
RF 0.091 0.776 0.943 1.000 0.143 0.854 0.249 0.921
for our purposes. We recognize that there is a need for a novel metric to define
the relationship between Fraud Classification Model performance and PONRM
effectiveness. As a heuristic, profit gain of the Fraud Classification Model can
be used since it is highly correlated with the profit gain of the PONRM.
• PONRM’s performance is noted to be positively correlated with the number of
layers in the PONRM component regardless of the utilized fraud classification
model. Thus, even deeper PONRM models may yield further promising results.
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Table 2.6: Classifier Performance - Digital Goods Store (DGS)
Profit Gain Precision Recall F-Measure
Risk Mgr None PONRM None PONRM None PONRM None PONRM
LR 0.005 0.393 0.364 0.927 0.044 0.313 0.079 0.468
GBM 0.069 0.489 0.696 0.9083 0.122 0.505 0.207 0.649
MLP 0.173 0.588 0.475 0.805 0.367 0.568 0.414 0.666
RF 0.174 0.724 0.993 1.000 0.201 0.694 0.335 0.820
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Chapter 3
LEVERAGING UNCERTAINTY IN DEEP LEARNING FOR SELECTIVE
CLASSIFICATION
3.1 Introduction
Machine learning classifiers are far from outputting perfect results due to several
reasons: data quality, feature informativeness, model selection, and hyper-parameter
tuning are just some of the factors contributing to the variability of the outcomes.
Although well-trained models offer high level of accuracy on the macro level, making
confident inferences for individual instances is difficult, nevertheless necessary.
Bayesian literature offers a rich set of classification techniques (Polson et al. (2017);
Rasmussen (2006)) for jointly quantifying uncertainty and prediction at inference
level. A recent application of dropout neural networks as Bayesian approximation of
deep Gaussian Process by Gal et al. open a new avenue of quantifying uncertainty
in traditional deep learning settings where a simple dropout mechanism is applicable
(Gal and Ghahramani (2016)).
The gained ability to effectively represent the uncertainty within existing deep
learning architectures has been an important step for democratizing AI safety (Amodei
et al. (2016)). Nevertheless, the following question still remains open: how can one
make use of the model uncertainty to make optimal decisions? The approach we focus
on in this study is called selective classification also known as classification with reject
option where the classifier rejects making a decision when uncertain.
Selective classification is critical for many applications, and the concept of “rejec-
tion” can have different meanings in various contexts. In medical diagnosis, a doctor
32
might order diagnostic tests before making a decision. In fraud management, an
expert human analyst would start a manual investigation. In self-driving cars, the
human driver would be given control to operate the vehicle. In all cases, rejecting
most of the instances would defeat the purpose and being inaccurate could result in
fatal consequences. Hence, a practical framework for selective classification must be
able to operate accurately under defined rejection capacity constraints.
A recent study in the medical domain by Leibig et al. (2017) has demonstrated the
potential of the model uncertainty for selective classification. However, the authors’
utilization of the measure is solely based on a simple ranking of it, which makes their
work unsuitable for many online or streaming settings. To the best of our knowledge,
how model uncertainty compares to or interacts with the more traditional ways of
conducting selective classification such as using Bayes risk introduced by Chow (1970)
has not been explored.
Hence, we propose a Mixed-Integer Programming (MIP) formulation for selective
classification called MIPSC to address these requirements. MIPSC finds optimal
classification and rejection regions by investigating the relationship between the model
uncertainty and predictive mean with the desired rejection capacity without having to
define arbitrary rejection costs. Furthermore, we develop cost-sensitive extensions to
our MIP model and exhibit the framework’s extensibility and usability in real-world
problems such as fraud management, where defining domain-specific and example-
dependent costs are necessary.
Main contributions of this chapter are:
1. Introducing the first mixed integer programming solution for selective classifi-
cation,
2. Utilizing predictive mean and model uncertainty of dropout NNs for optimal
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decision making,
3. Presenting an online fraud management case in a real-world setting.
3.2 Proposed Models
In this work, we propose a mixed integer programming model which finds optimal
regions in deep neural network classifier output to reject making a classification. To
take not only the output of the deep neural network classifier but also its uncertainty
into consideration we choose to use dropout NNs (DNN) Gal (2016) throughout our
modeling and experiments. Dropout NNs have been proven to approximate deep
Gaussian processes which generate predictive mean(µ) and model uncertainty(σ) in
the form of standard deviation. In the following sections, we explain how we make
use of both outputs (predictive mean and model uncertainty) of dropout NNs for
selective classification.
3.2.1 Mixed-Integer Programming based Selective Classification
Here, we define a mixed-integer programming model for selective classification
to make optimal decisions of classifications and rejections under uncertainty in deep
learning. Equivalent to other selective classification models, the aim is to ”reject”
making an automated classification for certain instances to increase the performance
on non-rejected samples. Similar to many supervised algorithms, our MIP model has
two main workflows: training and inference. In the training phase, given an already
trained dropout neural network (DNN), we learn the optimal criteria to reject samples
by minimizing the number of mistakes made after rejections. Besides, we design our
model in a way that it does not reject the samples without increasing the accuracy
in the non-rejected sample space. These properties give rise to our objective function
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as follows:
minimize
φD,φR
∑
i∈φD
[f(xi) 6= yi] + λ
∑
i∈φR
1
where xi ∈ IRn is the set of features for an instance i, yi ∈ {0, 1} is the label for
that instance, and f : IRn → {0, 1} is the previously trained deep neural network, φR
is the set of rejected instances, and φD is the set of non-rejected instances.
So, what does our model use to determine the rejection population, φR and the
decision population, φD? As introduced by Gal and Ghahramani (2016), our model
uses the concept ”model uncertainty” and enhances it with predictive mean to express
when the DNN is not confident with its prediction.
For every instance in the training set, we calculate the predictive mean (µi) and
the model uncertainty (σi) and map the points (µi,σi) to a 2D space. One intuitively
expects more homogeneous regions to be near lower values of the model uncertainty
and extremes of the predictive mean. This intuition can also be observed in Fig-
ure 3.1. Hence, our formulation aims to exploit and optimize upon this structure
and identifies the thresholds that define our model’s classification and rejection re-
gions. Before formally defining our model, we introduce the notation that we refer
to throughout this section in Table 3.2.2. We characterize five decision areas of clas-
sification and rejection and graphically demonstrate these areas in Figure 3.1. A1
defines the decision region for positive classification while A4 represents the decision
region for negative classification. A2 and A5 are rejection regions due to their high
model uncertainty. Thresholds to determine these regions are not tied together for
the purpose of handling imbalance or class specific patterns in the data. Finally, A3
is another rejection region housing instances having predictive means close to 0.5. In
this region, model uncertainty becomes trivial due to its context: it does not matter
how ”certain” the model is when making a decision similar to a coin toss.
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Variable Definition
yi Ground truth label of instance i
pi Positive classification indicator for instance i
ni Negative classification indicator for instance i
ri Rejection indicator for instance i
µi Predictive mean for instance i
σi Uncertainty for instance i
µL Left boundary for rejection
µR Right boundary for rejection
σL Upper uncertainty boundary for positive decisions
σR Upper uncertainty boundary for negative decisions
Li Left area indicator for instance i
Ri Right area indicator for instance i
DLi Down-left area indicator for instance i
DRi Down-right area indicator for instance i
rCap Rejection capacity
Table 3.1: Notation Table for MIPSC
Boundaries for these regions (σL, σR, µL, µR) are determined by the following set
of constraints operating in a supervised fashion through the objective. This is the
essential process executed by solving our MIP formulation.
Here, we start describing our constraints formally. The following constraint reg-
ulates the samples which do not reside in the rejection region A3 based on their
predictive means but on the right hand side of A3 such that i ∈ A4 ∪ A5:
µi > 0.5 + µR iff Ri = 1 (3.1)
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Figure 3.1: Graphical Illustration of the MIPSC Model
Now, we would like to distinguish the instances between A4 and A5 optimally such
that our model would make a negative classification decision only when DNN is certain
enough. The following constraints characterize the samples that conform to A4 such
that i ∈ A4:
σi < σR iff DRi = 1 (3.2)
Ri +DRi > 1 iff ni = 1 (3.3)
Similarly, the following constraint define the samples which do not reside in the rejec-
tion region A3 based on their predictive means but on the left hand side of A3 such
that i ∈ A1 ∪ A2:
µi < 0.5− µL iff Li = 1 (3.4)
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Further, we would like to distinguish the instances between A1 and A2 optimally
such that our model would make a positive classification decision only when DNN is
certain enough. The following constraints characterize the samples that conform to
A1 such that i ∈ A1:
σi < σL iff DLi = 1 (3.5)
Li +DLi > 1 iff pi = 1 (3.6)
As we have constrained our positive and negative classification decision regions, we
reject the remaining instances covered by the constraint below:
pi + ni + ri = 1 (3.7)
where the reject decision is assigned when our model cannot a make positive or
negative classification decision for instance i due to DNN uncertainty or predictive
mean.
Finally we would like to enforce a certain number of rejections based on our
application needs. This is given as:
( m∑
i=1
ri
) ≤ rCap (3.8)
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Combining our objective function and constraints together, then, setting M to be
a very large positive constant and fixing  to be a very small positive constant give
rise to the formal definition of our model as follows:
minimize
µL,µR,σL,σR
m∑
i=1
(piyi + ni(1− yi)) + λ
m∑
i=1
ri s.t. (3.9)
µR − +MRi ≥ µi − 0.5 ≥ µR −M(1−Ri),∀i (3.10)
M(1− Li)− µL ≥ µi − 0.5 ≥ − µL −MLi,∀i (3.11)
σL +M(1−DLi) ≥ σi ≥ σL + −MDLi ,∀i (3.12)
σR +M(1−DRi) ≥ σi ≥ σR + −MDRi ,∀i (3.13)
DLi + Li ≥ 2pi ≥ DLi + Li − 1,∀i (3.14)
DRi +Ri ≥ 2ni ≥ DRi +Ri − 1,∀i (3.15)
pi + ni + ri = 1,∀i (3.16)( m∑
i=1
ri
) ≤ rCap (3.17)
∀pi, ri, ni, Ri, Li, DLi , DRi ∈ {0, 1} (3.18)
∀i ∈ {1...m}, and µL, µR, σL, σR, λ ∈ IR (3.19)
In this formulation, constraint (3.10) is derived from (3.1), (3.11) is derived from
(3.4), (3.12) is derived from (3.5), (3.13) is derived from (3.2), (3.14) is derived from
(3.6), and (3.15) is derived from (3.3) following the Big-M method as shown in Griva
et al. (2009).
Following the training, inference is rather straightforward. After acquiring the
predictive mean and model uncertainty from DNN for the new sample, a user of our
model can arithmetically decide the region the new sample belongs to and make the
decision based on the optimal thresholds identified.
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3.2.2 Cost-Sensitive Selective Classification
Many classification with reject option problems are cost-sensitive by nature. For
instance, in medical diagnosis, consequences from a false negative decision can be
fatal if the diagnosis in question is cancer but not as critical if it is the common
cold. Within the same context, a doctor can order more tests with varying costs if
uncertain depending on the severity of the illness under study. We follow Elkan’s
definition Elkan (2001) and extend our model to ”example and class-dependent cost
sensitive” settings where each instance belonging to each class has a different cost
or benefit of making a correct or incorrect classification. Since the value add an-
other dimension to our problem, we extend the previously introduced five decision
regions to three dimensions and use simple thresholds for the value dimension for
each region. A graphical interpretation of this extension can be viewed in Figure 3.2.
Retaining our decision variables (σL, σR, µL, µR), we introduce five more thresholds
(tDR, tUR, tDL, tUL, tM ,) based on the third dimension, value (cost/benefit). Finally,
we assign the cost of rejection c to every reject decision, thus remove the rejection
regularizer from the objective function.
Inheriting constraints (3.1), (3.2), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.8); we extend our constraints
with the following statements:
The following constraint focuses on the region A1 and finds the value threshold
for that region. If the transaction corresponds to A1 region and its value is less than
the region’s value threshold, then our model makes a positive decision.
ti < tDL iff SDLi = 1 (3.20)
Li +DLi + SDLi > 2 iff pi1 = 1 (3.21)
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Figure 3.2: Graphical Illustration of the MIPCSC Model
Now, we would like to find our decision threshold for A2. Similarly to the previous
constraints, if the transaction corresponds to A2 region and its value is less than the
region’s value threshold, then our model makes a positive decision.
ti < tUL iff SULi = 1 (3.22)
Li + (1−DLi) + SULi > 2 iff pi2 = 1 (3.23)
Similar to the positive decision regions, now, we focus on the negative decision
regions: A4 and A5. The following constraint focuses on the region A4 and finds
the value threshold for that region. If the transaction corresponds to A4 region and
its value is less than the region’s value threshold, then our model makes a negative
decision.
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Variable Definition
ti Value for instance i
pij Positive classification indicator for instance i and area j
nij Negative classification indicator for instance i and area j
ri Rejection indicator for instance i
tDL Down-left area value boundary for rejection
tUL Upper-left area value boundary for rejection
tM Middle area value boundary for rejection
tDR Down-right area value boundary for rejection
tUR Upper-right area value boundary for rejection
SDLi Surface-down-left area indicator for instance i
SDRi Surface-down-right area indicator for instance i
SULi Surface-up-left area indicator for instance i
SURi Surface-up-right area indicator for instance i
SMi Surface-down-middle area indicator for instance i
Table 3.2: Additional Notation Table for MIPCSC
ti < tDR iff SDRi = 1 (3.24)
Ri +DRi + SDRi > 2 iff ni1 = 1 (3.25)
Now, we would like to find our decision threshold for A5. Similarly to the previous
constraints, if the transaction corresponds to A5 region and its value is less than the
region’s value threshold, then our model makes a negative decision.
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ti < tUR iff SURi = 1 (3.26)
Ri + (1−DRi) + SURi > 2 iff ni2 = 1 (3.27)
Finally, we move onto our middle region, A3. Here, we would like our model to
make a positive or negative decision using the predictive mean of 0.5 as the threshold
and considering the value threshold we optimally determine by solving the problem,
tM .
µi > 0.5 iff Qi = 1 (3.28)
ti < tM iff SMi = 1 (3.29)
(2− Li −Ri) + SMi + (1−Qi) > 3 iff pi3 = 1 (3.30)
(2− Li −Ri) + SMi +Qi > 3 iff ni3 = 1 (3.31)
As we have constrained our positive and negative classification decision regions,
we reject the remaining instances covered by the constraint below:
3∑
j=1
[pij] +
3∑
j=1
[nij] + ri = 1,∀i (3.32)
where the reject decision is assigned when our model cannot a make positive or
negative classification decision for instance i due to DNN uncertainty, predictive mean,
or it does not make financial sense to spend money on a reject decision.
Following our definition and our constraints, we propose our cost-sensitive frame-
work called Mixed-Integer Programming based Cost-Sensitive Selective Classification
(MIPCSC) formally as follows:
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maximize
µL,µR,σL,σR,
tDL,tUL,tM ,tDR,tUR
ωtp(
n∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
pij(1− yi)ti +
n∑
i=1
ri(1− yi)ti)
+ωtn(
m∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
nijyiti +
m∑
i=1
riyiti)
−ωfn(
m∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
nij(1− yi)ti)
−ωfp(
m∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
pijyiti)− c
m∑
i=1
ri (3.33)
µR − +MRi ≥ µi − 0.5 ≥ µR −M(1−Ri),∀i (3.34)
M(1− Li)− µL ≥ µi − 0.5 ≥ − µL −MLi,∀i (3.35)
σL +M(1−DLi) ≥ σi ≥ σL + −MDLi ,∀i (3.36)
σR +M(1−DRi) ≥ σi ≥ σR + −MDRi ,∀i (3.37)
0.5 + +MQi ≥ µi ≥ 0.5 +M(Qi − 1),∀i (3.38)
tDL +M(1− SDLi) ≥ ti ≥ tDL + − SDLi ,∀i (3.39)
tUL +M(1− SULi) ≥ ti ≥ tUL + − SULi ,∀i (3.40)
tM +M(1− SMi) ≥ ti ≥ tM + − SMi ,∀i (3.41)
tDR +M(1− SDRi) ≥ ti ≥ tDR + − SDRi ,∀i (3.42)
tUR +M(1− SURi) ≥ ti ≥ tUR + − SURi ,∀i (3.43)
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DLi + Li + SDLi ≥ 3pi1, ∀i (3.44)
DLi + Li + SDLi − 2 ≤ 3pi1, ∀i (3.45)
(1−DLi) + Li + SDLi ≥ 3pi2, ∀i (3.46)
(1−DLi) + Li + SDLi − 2 ≤ 3pi2,∀i (3.47)
DRi +Ri + SDRi ≥ 3ni1, ∀i (3.48)
DRi +Ri + SDRi − 2 ≤ 3ni1, ∀i (3.49)
(1−DRi) +Ri + SDRi ≥ 3ni2, ∀i (3.50)
(1−DRi) +Ri + SDRi − 2 ≤ 3ni2, ∀i (3.51)
(1− Li) + (1−Ri) + SMi + (1−Qi) ≥ 4pi3, ∀i (3.52)
(1− Li) + (1−Ri) + SMi + (1−Qi)− 3 ≤ 4pi3,∀i (3.53)
(1− Li) + (1−Ri) + SMi +Qi ≥ 4ni3,∀i (3.54)
(1− Li) + (1−Ri) + SMi +Qi − 3 ≤ 4ni3,∀i (3.55)
3∑
j=1
[pij] +
3∑
j=1
[nij] + ri = 1,∀i (3.56)
∀pij, ri, nij, Ri, Li, DLi , DRi , SDLi , SULi , SMi , SDRi , SURi ∈ {0, 1} (3.57)
∀i ∈ {1...m}, and µL, µR, σL, σR ∈ IR (3.58)
In this formulation, constraint (3.40) is derived from (3.28), (3.41) is derived from
(3.20), (3.42) is derived from (3.22), (3.43) is derived from (3.29), (3.44) is derived
from (3.24), and (3.45) is derived from (3.26).
Next, (3.46) and (3.47) are derived from (3.21), (3.48) and (3.49) are derived from
(3.23), (3.50) and (3.51) are derived from (3.25), and (3.52) and (3.53) are derived
from (3.27).
Finally, (3.54) and (3.55) are derived from (3.30), and (3.54) and (3.55) are derived
from (3.31) following the Big-M method as shown in Griva et al. (2009).
45
Inference using MIPCSC also follows similar steps to MIPSC. After predictive
mean, model uncertainty, and the cost/benefit for the new sample are obtained, a
user can arithmetically decide the region the new sample belongs to and make the
decision based on the optimal thresholds identified.
3.3 Experiments
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
We develop two sets of experiments for classification with reject option and its
cost-sensitive extension. For both tasks, we divide the dataset into four distinct
sets; the first to train the dropout neural network(DNN), the second to find optimal
dropout rate and regularization coefficient to quantify uncertainty, the third to train
the proposed MIP models, and the fourth to test the performance of the proposed
MIP models.
To quantify model uncertainty and predictive mean, we train a dropout neural
network of 2 hidden layers with relu activations and dropout applied before each
layer. For the implementation of DNN, we make use of the source codes of the
original authors made publicly available at their website 1 . We apply a grid search
among dropout rates of (0.05, 0.01, 0.02) and regularization coefficients (0.1, 0.25) to
achieve optimal DNN configuration.
3.3.2 Evaluation Metrics
Conventional measures of performance introduced for supervised classification
tasks do not represent the performance of a model with reject option under study,
comprehensively Condessa et al. (2017). Here we present four recently introduced
1https://github.com/yaringal/DropoutUncertaintyExps
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metrics for classification with reject optionCondessa et al. (2017) and cost sensitive
learningYildirim et al. (2018). Ideally, a classifier with reject option should classify
as many instances as possible correctly and reject to classify the ones that it would
misclassify. A cost-sensitive classifier with reject option makes these decisions based
on the profit or loss it would get from each instance. We use c for accurately clas-
sified and non-rejected samples, c for misclassified and non-rejected samples, r for
misclassified and rejected samples, r for accurately classified and rejected samples.
Non-rejected Accuracy measures the performance of classification of the model
on non-rejected samples. It is defined as c/(c+ c).
Classification Quality measures the performance of both classification and re-
jection of the model. It is defined as (c+ r)/(c+ r + c+ r)
Rejection Quality measures the relative performance of rejection to the overall
performance of classification. It is defined as (r/r)/
(
(c+ r)/(c+ r)
)
Profit Gain measures the level of gained profit from the model outcome rela-
tive to perfectly classifying every instance without any rejection and assigning every
instance to the majority class. Let $model be the profit gain of model under study,
$oracle be the profit gain of perfect model, and $majority be the profit gain of majority
class assigning model, we define profit gain as;
(
$model − $majority
)
/
(
$oracle − $majority
)
3.3.3 Experiments with UCI Datasets
In this section, we discuss how the performance of our framework is on several publicly
available datasets. We experiment with 11 datasets from UCI classification repository and
report our performance.
We setup experiments of binary classification with reject option on datasets coming
from various application areas. We refer readers to Table 3.3 for simple statistics of
datasets. They span applications of credit card applications(australian), medical diagno-
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Instances Features Majority Class
australian 689 14 67%
breast 699 19 65%
diabetic 1151 19 54%
heart 303 20 54%
sonar 208 60 53%
ionosphere 351 34 64%
german 208 60 70%
haberman 208 60 74%
seismic 208 60 93%
pima 208 60 65%
house 208 60 62%
Table 3.3: UCI Dataset Statistics
sis(breast,diabetic,heart), and discriminating the bouncing source of sonar signals(sonar).
The variety of imbalance from 53% to 93% among our datasets also helps us to stress our
framework to label imbalances.
Baselines
We compare the MIPSC with three other baselines.
Random baseline chooses samples to reject randomly.
Predictive mean baseline chooses the closest samples to have 0.5 predictive mean to
be rejected (Chow (1970); Grandvalet et al. (2009)).
Model uncertainty baseline chooses the samples with the highest standard deviation
to be rejected (Gal and Ghahramani (2016); Leibig et al. (2017)).
Comparison with random baseline helps us to investigate if using predictive mean or
model uncertainty adds any value to find optimal decisions when rejecting. Comparing
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Figure 3.3: Performance of the MIPSC and Other Baselines under Varying Rejection
Capacities. Notice the Superior Performance of MIPSC over the Recent State-of-the-
art and Other Baselines in All of the Three Performance Metrics for Publicly Available
Datasets: Australian, Breast, Diabetic, Heart, Sonar
Figure 3.4: Performance of the MIPSC and Other Baselines under Varying Rejection
Capacities. Notice the Superior Performance of MIPSC over the Recent State-of-the-
art and Other Baselines in All of the Three Performance Metrics for Publicly Available
Datasets: Ionosphere, German, Seismic, Pima, House, Haberman
MIPSC with predictive mean and model uncertainty separately allows us to investigate if
they are complementary in optimal decision making for classification with reject option.
Results
Figure 3.3 and Figure ?? show the performance of MIPSC, and the other baselines. We
make the following observations;
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Store Transactions Fraud-Ratio Avg. Amount($)
Digital Goods 67,215 8.1% $79.29
Office Supplies 10,678 17.2% $330.10
Sporting Goods 6,968 3.5% $296.34
Table 3.4: Online Purchase Transactions Dataset Statistics
• In all datasets and three evaluation metrics, MIPSC achieves a consistent superior
performance compared to the baselines.
• Higher rejection capacities yield higher non-rejected accuracy, as expected.
• Model uncertainty baseline consistently performs the second best signaling a better
characterization of rejection than predictive mean.
• Predictive mean can be a complementary in classification with rejection task as ev-
idenced by MIPSC higher performance than model uncertainty baseline. By itself,
predictive mean baseline achieves similar performances to the random baseline.
3.3.4 Online Fraud Management
In this section, we discuss the contribution of our cost-sensitive framework MIPCSC over
industry-standard baselines in online fraud management tasks. We design our experiments
with three real-world e-commerce online transaction datasets coming from digital goods,
office supplies, and sporting goods stores. Summary statistics of our datasets can be seen
in Table 3.4.
In online fraud management, our base task is to classify each transaction instance as
legitimate or fraudulent. Different than a standard classification task, benefits and costs
of each true and false classification vary with the transaction amount of each transaction
instance. Moreover, true classification of a legitimate transaction and a fraudulent transac-
tion do not bring same amount of benefit. False classification of legitimate transaction and
a fraudulent transaction incurs different costs as well (i.e., customer insult, fraud loss).
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Our task also involves rejecting making classification when uncertain. In online fraud
management domain, ”rejecting to make a decision” equates to sending the transaction
instance to an expert to be reviewed. This process of rejecting to make a decision also
comes with a cost. By taking all these aforementioned costs and benefits of the task into
consideration, here we present the final profit gain that our framework and several other
fraud management strategies achieve on three real-world datasets.
Baselines
We compare the MIPCSC with four other baselines. We adopt two of them from the previous
section (model uncertainty and random) and introduce two new cost-sensitive baselines.
Transaction amount baseline rejects to classify the instances with the largest trans-
action amounts. Majority of the transaction processors follows this conservative strategy.
Risk baseline rejects to classify the instances based on both model uncertainty and
transaction amount. It multiplies the model uncertainty and transaction amount and rejects
to classify the ones with the highest value.
Comparing MIPCSC with transaction amount baseline helps to assess whether our ap-
proach performs better than the most conservative fraud management strategy. Comparing
MIPCSC with risk baseline assist with understanding if our approach is capable of making
better assessments of cost-sensitive decisions than a simple arithmetic cost-sensitive risk
measurement.
Results
Figure 3.5 shows the performance of MIPCSC compared to the other baselines. Our key
observations are given as follows:
• Under varying capacities of rejection, MIPCSC always achieves the highest profit
gain.
• In the Digital Goods dataset, underlying DNN performs worse than outputting a
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Figure 3.5: Profit Gain of MIPCSC vs. Baselines for Fraud Management.
trivial solution, thus causes uncertainty based baselines to obtain negative profit gain
at various rejection capacities. It is clear that MIPCSC is robust to the underlying
DNN performance giving the highest profit gain in all cases.
• Constant inferior performance of the Risk baseline suggests that simply combining
uncertainty with a value aspect does not help making a cost-optimal decision. The
necessity of a framework like MIPCSC becomes apparent observing its constant ef-
fectiveness.
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Chapter 4
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I proposed novel cost-insensitive and cost-sensitive methods for
selective classification and demonstrated their effectiveness in online fraud management
domain. Here, I briefly summarize these methods and the contributions.
First, I provided a brief introduction to the selective classification problem in fraud
management and gave a detailed literature survey in cost-sensitive learning, in Chapter 1
and Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, I proposed a cost-sensitive decision making framework and demonstrate its
effectiveness in fraud management. I revealed how human expertise can be combined with
machine learning to make decisions under risk and cost considerations. Future work includes
developing a novel metric to characterize the relationship between fraud classification models
and PONRM performances. Also, investigating our framework’s generalizability in other
domains such as loan evaluation and healthcare decision support might be of interest.
In Chapter 4, I introduced MIPSC: a novel and extensible selective classification model
that effectively utilizes uncertainty in deep learning and combines it with predictive mean
to make optimal decisions. I demonstrated MIPSC’s effectiveness using state-of-the-art
selective classification metrics in publicly available datasets from various domains. I found
that predictive mean is complementary to model uncertainty for making optimal reject
decisions. Furthermore, I showcased a real-world use-case of online fraud management
using our cost-sensitive extension, MIPSCS. Future work includes (1) experimenting with
other Bayesian frameworks and (2) optimizing the MIP performance by designing novel
column generation techniques.
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